December briefing

The February 2015 elections look set to be the most contentious to date. The potential risk of violence remains particularly high given the set of complexities faced by the Nigerian government. These include the Boko Haram insurgency, religious tension spilling over into politics, and insecurity in the Niger Delta.

It is crucial that the government and other key state actors work together to ensure the risk of violence is minimised; this is of particular importance for northern Nigeria where the safety of voters is a major concern.

Political candidates have even been advised by religious leaders not to contest the forthcoming elections as it could only serve to intensify ethno-religious tensions. Religious affiliations have the potential to shroud issues that are also of great significance for Nigeria such as the importance of good governance.

This month’s analysis includes a report principally authored by Nnamdi Obasi assessing the potential risk of violence during the upcoming elections, a blog post by Emily Mellgard detailing the advice given to political candidates by a religious cleric, a piece by Ryan Cummings which considers the asymmetric warfare of the insurgency, and a blog by Andrew Noakes looking at the possibility of peace with Boko Haram.

Ola Akinfolarin
Assistant Coordinator

Our analysis

Nigeria’s Dangerous 2015 Elections: Limiting the Violence
Nnamdi Obasi, the principal author of this Crisis Group report, suggests that the risks of violence during the 2015 elections are particularly high given that this is the first nationwide contest between two parties since the return to civilian rule in 1999. Recommendations are offered to a number of key state actors to help mitigate the risk of widespread violence.

Nigerian Religious Leaders Advise Political Candidates
Emily Mellgard in this blog post highlights the advice that has been given to presidential aspirant Muhammadu Buhari and the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan by a prominent Muslim cleric.

Both politicians have been advised not to contest the election as it may propagate ethno-religious tensions with Buhari being seen as the Islamic candidate and Jonathan, the pro-Christian President. She concludes by suggesting that only time will tell if Buhari and Jonathan will heed this advice.

Elections, Boko Haram and Security: Assessing and Addressing Nigeria’s Complex Challenges
Dr Oliver Owen and Professor Mohammed Kuna, explore some of the debilitating challenges that Nigeria presently face; listen to the full discussion here.

Boko Haram and the Symmetry of Asymmetric Warfare
In this piece, Ryan Cummings assesses the acts of violence that have been carried out by the Boko Haram insurgency. He suggests that such acts remain characteristic of typical asymmetric warfare with suicide and car bombings, targeted assassinations and kidnappings to name a few, continuing to serve as preferred attack vectors. He analyses the possible strategic and ideological motivations behind the sect’s ongoing reliance on dispersed asymmetrical forms of violence.

Boko Haram: can a peace deal be negotiated?
Andrew Noakes, writing for Oxford Research Group’s sustainable security blog, considers what it would take to do a peace deal with Boko Haram. He concludes that the first step for achieving peace must be for the army to re-establish security for civilians in the north-east and take the momentum away from the insurgents. Then the underlying drivers of the conflict, including under-development and human rights violations, must be addressed.

Key findings from this briefing

  • 2015 elections will be the most contentious elections since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999.
  • There is a potential risk of violence during the upcoming elections and the government must take the necessary steps to ensure the safety of voters.
  • The state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe could prevent voting in parts of north-eastern states.
  • Ethno-religious tensions could be a prominent feature of the 2015 elections; political candidates have been advised not to politicise religious differences.
  • A contest between a political candidate from the north and his Niger Delta counterpart, could result in violence in both regions depending on the outcome of the election.
  • The possible strategic and ideological aims of Boko Haram would suggest that the acts of terror employed could have some underlying motivations.
  • Taking the momentum away from Boko Haram in the north-east is a prerequisite for any peace deal.
  • It is essential to address the underlying drivers of the conflict in order to lay the groundwork for peace.

Nigeria’s Dangerous 2015 Elections: Limiting the Violence

In this comprehensive report, Nnamdi Obasi, the Principal Author reviews the potential risk for violence around the 2015 elections in Nigeria. With the first nationwide contest between the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC) since the return to civilian rule in 1999, the risks are particularly high.

Read the full report here.

November briefing

As the Boko Haram insurgency continues in the north-east, the Senate is deadlocked on the extension of the state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states. Many senators have complained that emergency rule has made little difference in the region, or even that it has made things worse.

It is important for the government to have a clear legal framework through which it can prosecute the counter-insurgency campaign. Nonetheless, it must ensure this framework does not enable human rights violations or other abuses that are ultimately counter-productive. Tangible assurances on this issue may well help assuage the concerns of many northern senators.

The protection of human rights as part of a successful counter-insurgency strategy is a central point in a new report from Ambassador John Campbell that we feature in this month’s briefing. The report is aimed at the US government and advises what the United States can do to assist Nigeria in tackling Boko Haram.

This month’s briefing also features new analysis from Jacob Zenn on Boko Haram’s recruitment, operations, and financing in the Lake Chad region, a report on Nigeria’s elections from Oliver Owen, observations about Boko Haram’s governance in areas where it has captured territory from John Campbell, a feature on the socio-economic and political drivers of the insurgency, analysis from Ryan Cummings on Chad’s role in the conflict, a piece by Emily Mellgard on the role of youth and the potential for unrest during the upcoming elections, and a new interview from the Testimonial Archive Project.

Andrew Noakes
Nigeria Security Network

Our analysis

Can the US help Nigeria confront Boko Haram?
This report from John Campbell calls on the US government to press Abuja privately and publicly on the human rights record of the Nigerian security forces. It emphasises the importance of tackling the underlying drivers of the insurgency and ensuring the counter-insurgency campaign commands public support. It also calls on the US to reach out to Nigeria’s Muslim population, in part by establishing a diplomatic presence in Kano.

Boko Haram: recruitment, financing, and arms trafficking in the Lake Chad region
This analysis from Jacob Zenn draws attention to new trends in Boko Haram’s recruitment, operations, and financing. It concludes that Boko Haram is using forced conscription to boost its numbers, with as many as 50,000 now estimated to be fighting for or assisting the insurgency. It also notes that Boko Haram is increasingly turning its attention to Cameroon, in part to secure supply lines for weapons.

Incumbency and Opportunity: forecasting Nigeria’s 2015 elections
Co-authored by Oliver Owen, this research suggests President Jonathan is likely to win an overall majority in the 2015 presidential election, but not necessarily the required one-quarter of votes in two-thirds of states.

Nigeria’s Boko Haram moving towards governance?
John Campbell uses this blog to draw attention to media reports indicating Boko Haram is providing security for residents in towns it has captured and ordering shops to open. This would suggest a move towards some kind of governance, though the reports conflict with other stories of Boko Haram violence in occupied communities.

What does Boko Haram want?
This piece analyses some of the socio-economic and political drivers of the Boko Haram insurgency. It advises that any peace deal with the insurgents must include accountability for human rights violations and measures to address under-development in the north.

The Boko Haram ceasefire and the Chadian gambit
In this blog by Ryan Cummings, he analyses Chad’s role in the conflict. He suggests Chad has an interest in promoting stability on its borders by encouraging talks between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government, as well as the Chadian president having a personal interest in discrediting rumours that he is a Boko Haram sponsor.

Religion, Politics, and the Youth Factor in Nigeria’s Elections
Emily Mellgard warns that religious and political leaders risk triggering social unrest around the upcoming elections by failing to positively engage young people. She concludes that youth alienation could be a major factor behind future instability in Nigeria.

“I kept my grip firm on the hand with the gun”
In this interview with Saratu Abiola’s Testimonial Archive Project, a resident of Gombe recalls a terrorist attack in which he came face to face with Boko Haram militants.

Key points from this briefing

  • The United States can help Nigeria tackle Boko Haram by encouraging it to respect human rights and tackle the underlying drivers of the conflict
  • The US should also establish a diplomatic presence in Kano and reach out to Nigeria’s Muslims
  • Boko Haram is swelling its ranks with forced conscription and has become much more active in Cameroon
  • President Jonathan may struggle to meet all the requirements necessary to win the election outright
  • There are reports that Boko Haram is establishing some form of governance in captured territories
  • The socio-economic and political drivers of the conflict must be addressed as part of any peace deal
  • Chad has a number of motivations to play a constructive role in tackling the insurgency
  • Nigerian politicians and religious leaders must do all they can to avoid alienating the country’s youth during this election, or they may otherwise become a future source of instability

October briefing

Our October briefing comes a week after an extraordinary announcement from the governments of Nigeria and Chad that a ceasefire agreement has been reached with Boko Haram. The deal is said to include a commitment from the insurgents to imminently return the Chibok girls.

However, the girls are yet to be released, and Boko Haram are reported to have carried out a series of attacks in north-east Nigeria in recent days, including an attack on the strategic town of Damboa in Borno state. There have also been reports of more girls being kidnapped.

Though the Chadian government has dismissed the attacks as the work of irreconcilable factions in Boko Haram, they do cast doubt on the ceasefire. The credibility of Boko Haram’s “representative” during the talks, Danladi Ahmadu, has also been questioned by sources familiar with the group’s leaders, most notably the journalist Ahmad Salkida.

We hope these doubts are put to rest and the ongoing negotiations bear fruit. The next few days will be a test of their credibility.

This month’s briefing includes an analysis of the ceasefire deal, a piece by Elizabeth Pearson examining the increasingly important role women are playing in Boko Haram, and an article by Ryan Cummings assessing the options for bringing back the Chibok girls.

I would also like to use this briefing as an opportunity to pay tribute to Senator Musiliu Obanikoro, who recently stepped down as Minister of State for Defence. Senator Obanikoro’s willingness to embrace a holistic approach to tackling Boko Haram has set a strong example for the rest of the security establishment to follow. We wish him well for the future.

Andrew Noakes

Our analysis

Nigeria’s Boko Haram ceasefire deal: too good to be true?
Andrew Noakes questions the credibility of the ceasefire deal reached with Boko Haram. He warns of the danger of political motivations becoming a driving force behind the approach to the insurgency, noting that both the APC and the PDP have been guilty of politicising the war. He calls on all parties to agree to keep politics out of the counter-insurgency campaign.

Nigeria’s female suicide bombers: a show of strength
Elizabeth Pearson argues that although the deployment of female suicide bombers by Boko Haram has not proved a long-term tactic thus far, women are playing an increasingly important role in the insurgency. They are particularly useful for helping the group to conduct its activities, such as smuggling weapons, in secret. The use of female suicide bombers has served an important propaganda purpose and initially helped to divert attention away from Boko Haram’s operations in the north-east.

Where are our girls?
In this piece by Ryan Cummings, he assesses the various options open to the Nigerian government to secure the release of the Chibok girls. He argues that a negotiated settlement is very possible, though the government must be careful not to give too much away. He questions whether a military operation to rescue the girls would be feasible, given the level of risk involved.

Key points from this briefing

  • There are reasons to question the credibility of the ceasefire deal with Boko Haram, though we remain hopeful that negotiations will bear fruit.
  • Politicisation of the insurgency is becoming a major hindrance to efforts to tackle it.
  • The emergence of female suicide bombers shows Boko Haram’s ability to wage an effective propaganda campaign and divert attention away from its real goals.
  • Women are playing an increasingly important role in Boko Haram in general.
  • The government’s best option for securing the release of the Chibok girls is a negotiated settlement, though it must be careful not to give too much away.

September briefing

Since our last briefing in August, Boko Haram has made major territorial gains in Nigeria’s north-east region, seizing a string of towns in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. In our special report, North-east Nigeria on the brink, we warned that Maiduguri – the capital of Borno – was in danger of being attacked.

Since then, Boko Haram has advanced to within 35km of Maiduguri and is now launching attacks on the nearby town of Konduga. Though the pace of the insurgency’s gains has slowed in the last two weeks, the threat to Maiduguri remains.

As well as featuring our special report, this briefing includes a piece from Ryan Cummings analysing the connection between events in Iraq and Nigeria, an article from Alkasim Abdulkadir questioning controversial claims made by Stephen Davis about Boko Haram’s political supporters, new analysis from Zacharias Pieri on Boko Haram’s plans for a caliphate in northern Nigeria, and an interview from the Testimonial Archive Project providing a rare insight into what’s going on in the towns captured by Boko Haram.

Andrew Noakes

Our analysis

North-east Nigeria on the brink
In a joint report from the members of the Nigeria Security Network, we warn of the danger posed to Maiduguri and the rest of north-east Nigeria following Boko Haram’s rapid territorial gains. We warn that the military must act quickly to send reinforcements, ammunition, and equipment to the north-east to counter Boko Haram’s changing tactics.

Of Caliphates
Ryan Cummings answers some commonly asked questions about the connections between the Islamic State in Iraq and Boko Haram in Nigeria. He concludes Boko Haram’s aspirations for a caliphate predate the Islamic State and that it is unlikely the two groups will develop a formal alliance due to Boko Haram’s relationship with al-Qaeda.

Boko Haram, Stephen Davis and the strange tales from Perth
Alkasim Abdulkadir questions the credibility of Stephen Davis and his claims about Boko Haram’s political connections. He argues Davis cannot have gone to north-east Nigeria and would not have been seen by Boko Haram as a legitimate intermediary.

Boko Haram’s Islamic Caliphate is becoming a reality in Northeastern Nigeria
In this analysis piece, Zacharias Pieri provides some historical context for Boko Haram’s stated aim of establishing a caliphate, explaining that the insurgents are inspired by Dan Fodio’s Sokoto Caliphate. He also shows how the group is developing the infrastructure for a caliphate in the north-east.

‘How can you depend on the military to protect you?’
In this interview from Saratu Abiola’s Testimonial Archive Project, a resident of Maiduguri relays information from towns captured by Boko Haram. He reveals that only women and the old remain in captured areas, Boko Haram are doing nothing to provide services, and people are struggling to feed themselves. He adds that he supports the military but does not trust them, though he points out the CJTF have done much to improve relations between the people and the army.

Key points from this briefing

  • Boko Haram has not yet attacked Maiduguri but they remain in control of large parts of Borno State.
  • The military must continue to reinforce Borno and provide enough ammunition and functional equipment to counter-attack.
  • Boko Haram’s tactics have changed in the north-east. They have gone from carrying out hit-and-run attacks to seizing and holding territory.
  • Boko Haram is not going to join up with the Islamic State in Iraq, though they have undoubtedly been spurred on by its successes.
  • The insurgency’s aim of establishing a caliphate has historical roots.
  • Stephen Davis’s claims about Boko Haram’s political connections are highly dubious.
  • There is no evidence of Boko Haram attempting to govern in any meaningful way in the areas it has captured.
  • The military are not trusted by the local population in the north-east, though the CJTF have improved relations a little.

Nigeria on the verge of losing Borno state

Nigeria on the verge of losing Borno state

Nigeria stands on the verge of being split in two as Boko Haram makes lightning territorial gains in the north-east of the country, we warn in a special report, North-East Nigeria on the brink

The report warns that Boko Haram is preparing to take over Borno’s state capital, Maiduguri, following an attack on Bama to the south-east.

“If Maiduguri falls, it will be a symbolic and strategic victory unparalleled so far in the conflict,” the report says.

A successful attack could be followed by a take over of the whole of Borno state and possibly parts of Adamawa, Yobe, and neighbouring Cameroon.

The report says, “Unless swift action is taken, Nigeria could be facing a rapid takeover of a large area of its territory reminiscent of ISIS’s lightning advances in Iraq.”

We call on the Nigerian government to urgently reinforce Maiduguri to prevent it falling into enemy hands and re-gain control over Borno’s network of roads to stem the insurgency’s advance.

Low morale and inadequate equipment in the army is causing soldiers to refuse to counter-attack and flee from battle. They must be provided with adequate equipment and ammunition to confidently stand against Boko Haram in battle.

Unless drastic action is taken, Nigeria stands to lose a large portion of its territory with an accompanying humanitarian crisis.

For more information, read the full report.

August briefing

As we approach the 2015 presidential election, the temptation to use the insurgency for electoral gain is getting stronger. Politicians from both the PDP and the APC are blaming each other for Boko Haram, with some even accusing their opponents of supporting the insurgents.

It’s worth remembering that politicising a conflict can make it even worse. By turning against each other, political leaders risk distracting themselves from fighting the real enemy. Boko Haram is making alarming gains in the north-east, even recently seizing the town of Damboa. Now is not the time to take our eye off the ball. Much needed funding for the counter-insurgency has also been delayed by politicking, and the demonisation of the APC is undoubtedly further fuelling discontent in the north.

The 2015 election should be a time for Nigeria to show its strength and resolve against the insurgency. The best way to do that is for politicians to avoid blaming each other and instead unite against their common enemy.

This month’s analysis includes a more detailed warning from me about the dangers of politicising the insurgency, a piece by Andrew Walker reviewing the 100 days since the Chibok abduction, new observations from Jacob Zenn about Boko Haram’s evolution, and more.

Andrew Noakes

Our analysis

Playing politics with Nigeria’s insurgency risks civil war
This piece draws attention to the risks of playing politics with the insurgency, including further alienation of the north, distracting the country’s leadership away from Boko Haram at a time when they’re making gains, and hampering the allocation of resources to the military. The nightmare scenario is that the election causes broader unrest and violence in the north. Politicians should do everything they can to ensure this doesn’t happen.

Nigeria is dancing on the brink
John Campbell gives this interview to the Citizen. He warns there is a serious risk of instability in Nigeria and that political life has become unsettled by the approach of elections in 2015. Asked whether there’s anything he would now add to his book about Nigeria, Campbell suggests he would pay more attention to the problem of corruption.

100 days of violence, rumors, and loss
Andrew Walker gives a critical assessment of Nigeria’s response to the Chibok abduction, 100 days on. He suggests that the government’s ability to handle Boko Haram will determine Nigeria’s long-term stability and viability, and that much remains to be done. He also offers an overview of the myriad conspiracy theories that have cropped up following the abduction, and reminds us that all of the theorising and politicking surrounding Chibok are a world away from the real struggles faced by people in the north.

Boko Haram opens new fronts in Lagos and Nigeria’s middle belt
In this new analysis from Jacob Zenn, he argues that Boko Haram are expanding their operations into the middle belt and Lagos. He suggests that a new faction is responsible for the Lagos suicide attack in June, and that Ansaru has reintegrated into Boko Haram and is carrying out the middle belt attacks. He also says that Boko Haram has internalised Ansaru’s kidnapping skills and is using them to carry out abductions in the north. The biggest threat to Nigeria, though, comes from Boko Haram’s seizure of territory in the north-east. Zenn argues that they could create a region free from government control in which to found a new Islamic state.

“I have more than twenty refugees seeking refuge in my house as a result of this insurgency”
Saratu Abiola’s Testimonial Archive Project has conducted a fresh group of interviews with people affected by the insurgency, as well as subject matter experts. In this interview, a young civil servant in Yobe explains that Boko Haram attacks villages when their inhabitants refuse to cooperate. He also says the state of emergency has not been very useful in the fight against Boko Haram.

Is Nigeria’s Boko Haram Becoming Territorial?
In his latest blog, John Campbell asks whether Boko Haram is establishing territory in north-east Nigeria. He notes that Boko Haram has taken over the town of Damboa, raising its flag and establishing checkpoints. Until now, Boko Haram has been more well known for its hit-and-run attacks rather than for seizing towns. Damboa could signal a new phase of the insurgency.

Key points from this briefing

- There’s a growing risk the 2015 elections will inflame the Boko Haram insurgency unless politicians are able to avoid politicising the conflict

- The elections are going to be destabilising in general

- While conspiracy theories abound about the Chibok abduction, the people of the north need practical help to keep them safe

- Boko Haram has opened up new fronts in Lagos and the middle belt

- The greatest threat still comes from Boko Haram’s activities in the north-east, where they are trying to create an Islamic state

- Boko Haram have started to seize territory

- The insurgents attack villagers when they are not cooperative, suggesting people are forced to cooperate through fear