February briefing

The Nigerian military’s success in recent days and weeks recapturing territory from Boko Haram should give observers cause for relief. Complemented by regional intervention from Nigeria’s neighbours, the Nigerian army appears to be making significant gains in the north-east. We must hope this is the beginning of a reversal of Boko Haram’s fortunes over the last few months.

Much of the analysis over recent weeks has focused on President Jonathan’s decision to postpone the presidential election in order to give the army a chance to recapture territory. As ever, NSN’s own focus remains on the security situation. However, we remain concerned about the possibility that Boko Haram could destabilise Nigeria’s democracy and trigger considerable violence and unrest more broadly in the country.

This month’s analysis focuses on Boko Haram’s evolving media and public messaging strategy, Boko Haram’s threat to the elections, the insurgency’s geographic spread, and the response to the insurgency.

Andrew Noakes

Our analysis

Boko Haram mimics Islamic State
This piece by Zacharias Pieri argues Boko Haram is learning from Islamic State, especially with respect to its media and public messaging strategy.

Blood and the Ballot Box: Boko Haram and Nigerian elections
Ryan Cummings examines the threat Boko Haram poses to Nigerian democracy and the upcoming elections. He assesses the risks across geographic areas and types of target, and analyses the political implications of Boko Haram’s violence.

The Boko Haram insurgency: separating fact from fiction
Ryan Cummings picks apart the various fact/fiction debates surrounding Boko Haram, including the group’s name, its relationship with Islamic State, and its hold over territory.

“The soldiers are less motivated than the insurgents”
In this interview, Nnamdi Obasi answers a series of questions about Boko Haram and the counter-insurgency, including whether the West should intervene military in Nigeria and what the best strategy for defeating the insurgency is.

Mindful of the Islamic State, Boko Haram Broadens Reach into Lake Chad Region
Jacob Zenn analyses Boko Haram’s expansion into the Lake Chad region. He concludes that the insurgency’s focus is still on Borno but is also expanding to neighbouring countries, including with respect to recruitment.

Has the tide turned against Boko Haram in Nigeria?
John Campbell argues that recent gains against Boko Haram by the Nigerian military may be enough to satisfy President Jonathan’s criteria for holding elections.

Key points from this briefing

  • Boko Haram is learning from Islamic State and developing a more sophisticated media and public messaging strategy
  • Boko Haram represents a clear threat to Nigerian democracy, particularly because their attacks have the potential to cause a political crisis
  • Boko Haram does not hold territory in the traditional sense, often leaving captured areas undefended
  • There must be no major Western military intervention in Nigeria because it would be resented by Nigerians and could be counter-productive
  • There still remain problems in the Nigerian army with lack of resources, equipment, and poor motivation
  • Boko Haram is still mostly focused on Borno but is extending its reach into countries in the Lake Chad region
  • The Nigerian military’s successes in recent weeks may make elections possible

January briefing

Boko Haram continues to carry out attacks across north-east Nigeria and would appear to be gaining momentum. This month alone has been characterised by widespread violence with suggestions that up to 2,000 people died in a single attack in Baga on the 7 January. It may, however, be impossible to independently verify this figure due to a lack of clear information.

The porous border between Nigeria and Cameroon continues to be utilised by Boko Haram as a safe haven and transport route for fighters and supplies. Seemingly, Boko Haram has no regard for national boundaries and whilst the majority of attacks have taken place in Nigeria, the possibility of continued cross border attacks should not be ruled out. The most recent atrocity which occurred on the 18 January in Cameroon in which 80 people were abducted would explain the calls by African heads of state for an African Union led offensive to combat Boko Haram once and for all.

Upcoming elections continue to create mounting anxiety as escalation of violence by Boko Haram looks set to intensify. As with previous elections, ethnic and religious identities are emphasised with Muhammadu Buhari being perceived to be the Muslim presidential hopeful of the north and incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan as the Christian president of the south. However, with one million displaced persons in the north unable to vote, this could have significant implications on the outcome of the elections.

Ola Akinfolarin
Assistant Coordinator

Our analysis

Murder by numbers: assessing the credibility of the Baga death toll
In this piece, Ryan Cummings questions whether it is indeed credible to believe that Boko Haram killed as many as 2,000 people in a single act of mass violence on 7 January. The attack on Baga as well as surrounding towns looks as if it could be Boko Haram’s deadliest act in a catalogue of increasingly heinous attacks carried out by the insurgency. However, the quoted death toll of 2,000 may not be specific to Baga alone but rather a cumulative figure derived from a spate of Boko Haram attacks which occurred between 3 and 7 January.

Briefing note: Boko Harm in Cameroon
Emily Mellgard examines the legacy of Boko Haram attacks that have taken place in Cameroon. On 18 January, suspected Boko Haram militants attacked multiple villages among the Mandera Mountains in the Mayo-Tsnaga Department of Cameroon’s Far North Region. At least 4 people were reported dead and 80 people were abducted, 50 of which were children.

Boko Haram has conducted post border raids since at least 2013 in Cameroon. As military pressure on Boko Haram activities in Nigeria escalates, it can be expected that they will continue to use the border as a base from which to launch attacks.

Boko Haram: Jihad is local
In this interview, Zacharias Pieri discusses the latest ideological and tactical developments of Boko Haram. The mass abductions of the girls in Chibok and the use of young girls as suicide bombers would indicate that Boko Haram is in a new phase and their strategies have changed. On an ideological level however, the movement has remained consistent since 2009 in trying to create an Islamic caliphate in northern Nigeria. The Boko Haram ideology is also internationally enhanced and tied to the global growth of radical Islam, particularly in the form promoted by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Boko Haram and the Ballot Box
Andrew Noakes analyses the potential impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on the February 14 presidential election as their campaign of terror continues in the northeast of Nigeria. Since June, the Islamic militant group has seized some 20,000 square miles in the three north eastern states of Yobe, Adamawa and Borno. This is problematic for presidential hopeful Muhammadu Buhari as support for APC comes largely from Nigeria’s majority Muslim northern states. One million plus people that have been forced to flee the militants in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa will not be allowed to vote as Nigeria’s election law only allows people to cast ballots in their local area; one million votes could make all the difference in what is set to be a close race.

Nigeria’s elections in 2011 and 2015
In this piece, John Campbell provides a comparative analysis of the 2011 Nigerian elections and the upcoming 2015 elections. In 2011, sitting president Goodluck Jonathan was elected defeating Muhammadu Buhari. In many ways the 2011 elections set the stage for the current national crisis. As in 2015, the two presidential candidates are the Christian Jonathan and the Muslim Buhari. The campaigns were marred by ethnic and religious identities. As a result the election results further demarcated the country along the lines of a Muslim north and a Christian south. Once again in 2015, there are appeals to ethnic and religious identities but the question still remains as to how the one million displaced persons will vote – the mounting anxiety therefore surrounding the upcoming elections is not misplaced.

Key findings

  • The reported 2,000 people massacred in Baga is yet to be verified.
  • Boko Haram continues to utilise the porous border between Cameroon and Chad, using it as a transportation corridor for supplies and fighters.
  • Religious and ethnic identities continue to play a prominent role in the upcoming elections. Buhari is seen as the Muslim president of the north and Jonathan, the Christian president of the south.
  • With one million displaced persons potentially unable to vote in north eastern Nigeria, this may disadvantage Buhari.
  • There is a strong possibility of increased levels of violence before and after the elections due to ethnic and religious identities that continue to play a prominent role.

December briefing

The February 2015 elections look set to be the most contentious to date. The potential risk of violence remains particularly high given the set of complexities faced by the Nigerian government. These include the Boko Haram insurgency, religious tension spilling over into politics, and insecurity in the Niger Delta.

It is crucial that the government and other key state actors work together to ensure the risk of violence is minimised; this is of particular importance for northern Nigeria where the safety of voters is a major concern.

Political candidates have even been advised by religious leaders not to contest the forthcoming elections as it could only serve to intensify ethno-religious tensions. Religious affiliations have the potential to shroud issues that are also of great significance for Nigeria such as the importance of good governance.

This month’s analysis includes a report principally authored by Nnamdi Obasi assessing the potential risk of violence during the upcoming elections, a blog post by Emily Mellgard detailing the advice given to political candidates by a religious cleric, a piece by Ryan Cummings which considers the asymmetric warfare of the insurgency, and a blog by Andrew Noakes looking at the possibility of peace with Boko Haram.

Ola Akinfolarin
Assistant Coordinator

Our analysis

Nigeria’s Dangerous 2015 Elections: Limiting the Violence
Nnamdi Obasi, the principal author of this Crisis Group report, suggests that the risks of violence during the 2015 elections are particularly high given that this is the first nationwide contest between two parties since the return to civilian rule in 1999. Recommendations are offered to a number of key state actors to help mitigate the risk of widespread violence.

Nigerian Religious Leaders Advise Political Candidates
Emily Mellgard in this blog post highlights the advice that has been given to presidential aspirant Muhammadu Buhari and the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan by a prominent Muslim cleric.

Both politicians have been advised not to contest the election as it may propagate ethno-religious tensions with Buhari being seen as the Islamic candidate and Jonathan, the pro-Christian President. She concludes by suggesting that only time will tell if Buhari and Jonathan will heed this advice.

Elections, Boko Haram and Security: Assessing and Addressing Nigeria’s Complex Challenges
Dr Oliver Owen and Professor Mohammed Kuna, explore some of the debilitating challenges that Nigeria presently face; listen to the full discussion here.

Boko Haram and the Symmetry of Asymmetric Warfare
In this piece, Ryan Cummings assesses the acts of violence that have been carried out by the Boko Haram insurgency. He suggests that such acts remain characteristic of typical asymmetric warfare with suicide and car bombings, targeted assassinations and kidnappings to name a few, continuing to serve as preferred attack vectors. He analyses the possible strategic and ideological motivations behind the sect’s ongoing reliance on dispersed asymmetrical forms of violence.

Boko Haram: can a peace deal be negotiated?
Andrew Noakes, writing for Oxford Research Group’s sustainable security blog, considers what it would take to do a peace deal with Boko Haram. He concludes that the first step for achieving peace must be for the army to re-establish security for civilians in the north-east and take the momentum away from the insurgents. Then the underlying drivers of the conflict, including under-development and human rights violations, must be addressed.

Key findings from this briefing

  • 2015 elections will be the most contentious elections since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999.
  • There is a potential risk of violence during the upcoming elections and the government must take the necessary steps to ensure the safety of voters.
  • The state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe could prevent voting in parts of north-eastern states.
  • Ethno-religious tensions could be a prominent feature of the 2015 elections; political candidates have been advised not to politicise religious differences.
  • A contest between a political candidate from the north and his Niger Delta counterpart, could result in violence in both regions depending on the outcome of the election.
  • The possible strategic and ideological aims of Boko Haram would suggest that the acts of terror employed could have some underlying motivations.
  • Taking the momentum away from Boko Haram in the north-east is a prerequisite for any peace deal.
  • It is essential to address the underlying drivers of the conflict in order to lay the groundwork for peace.

Nigeria’s Dangerous 2015 Elections: Limiting the Violence

In this comprehensive report, Nnamdi Obasi, the Principal Author reviews the potential risk for violence around the 2015 elections in Nigeria. With the first nationwide contest between the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC) since the return to civilian rule in 1999, the risks are particularly high.

Read the full report here.

November briefing

As the Boko Haram insurgency continues in the north-east, the Senate is deadlocked on the extension of the state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states. Many senators have complained that emergency rule has made little difference in the region, or even that it has made things worse.

It is important for the government to have a clear legal framework through which it can prosecute the counter-insurgency campaign. Nonetheless, it must ensure this framework does not enable human rights violations or other abuses that are ultimately counter-productive. Tangible assurances on this issue may well help assuage the concerns of many northern senators.

The protection of human rights as part of a successful counter-insurgency strategy is a central point in a new report from Ambassador John Campbell that we feature in this month’s briefing. The report is aimed at the US government and advises what the United States can do to assist Nigeria in tackling Boko Haram.

This month’s briefing also features new analysis from Jacob Zenn on Boko Haram’s recruitment, operations, and financing in the Lake Chad region, a report on Nigeria’s elections from Oliver Owen, observations about Boko Haram’s governance in areas where it has captured territory from John Campbell, a feature on the socio-economic and political drivers of the insurgency, analysis from Ryan Cummings on Chad’s role in the conflict, a piece by Emily Mellgard on the role of youth and the potential for unrest during the upcoming elections, and a new interview from the Testimonial Archive Project.

Andrew Noakes
Nigeria Security Network

Our analysis

Can the US help Nigeria confront Boko Haram?
This report from John Campbell calls on the US government to press Abuja privately and publicly on the human rights record of the Nigerian security forces. It emphasises the importance of tackling the underlying drivers of the insurgency and ensuring the counter-insurgency campaign commands public support. It also calls on the US to reach out to Nigeria’s Muslim population, in part by establishing a diplomatic presence in Kano.

Boko Haram: recruitment, financing, and arms trafficking in the Lake Chad region
This analysis from Jacob Zenn draws attention to new trends in Boko Haram’s recruitment, operations, and financing. It concludes that Boko Haram is using forced conscription to boost its numbers, with as many as 50,000 now estimated to be fighting for or assisting the insurgency. It also notes that Boko Haram is increasingly turning its attention to Cameroon, in part to secure supply lines for weapons.

Incumbency and Opportunity: forecasting Nigeria’s 2015 elections
Co-authored by Oliver Owen, this research suggests President Jonathan is likely to win an overall majority in the 2015 presidential election, but not necessarily the required one-quarter of votes in two-thirds of states.

Nigeria’s Boko Haram moving towards governance?
John Campbell uses this blog to draw attention to media reports indicating Boko Haram is providing security for residents in towns it has captured and ordering shops to open. This would suggest a move towards some kind of governance, though the reports conflict with other stories of Boko Haram violence in occupied communities.

What does Boko Haram want?
This piece analyses some of the socio-economic and political drivers of the Boko Haram insurgency. It advises that any peace deal with the insurgents must include accountability for human rights violations and measures to address under-development in the north.

The Boko Haram ceasefire and the Chadian gambit
In this blog by Ryan Cummings, he analyses Chad’s role in the conflict. He suggests Chad has an interest in promoting stability on its borders by encouraging talks between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government, as well as the Chadian president having a personal interest in discrediting rumours that he is a Boko Haram sponsor.

Religion, Politics, and the Youth Factor in Nigeria’s Elections
Emily Mellgard warns that religious and political leaders risk triggering social unrest around the upcoming elections by failing to positively engage young people. She concludes that youth alienation could be a major factor behind future instability in Nigeria.

“I kept my grip firm on the hand with the gun”
In this interview with Saratu Abiola’s Testimonial Archive Project, a resident of Gombe recalls a terrorist attack in which he came face to face with Boko Haram militants.

Key points from this briefing

  • The United States can help Nigeria tackle Boko Haram by encouraging it to respect human rights and tackle the underlying drivers of the conflict
  • The US should also establish a diplomatic presence in Kano and reach out to Nigeria’s Muslims
  • Boko Haram is swelling its ranks with forced conscription and has become much more active in Cameroon
  • President Jonathan may struggle to meet all the requirements necessary to win the election outright
  • There are reports that Boko Haram is establishing some form of governance in captured territories
  • The socio-economic and political drivers of the conflict must be addressed as part of any peace deal
  • Chad has a number of motivations to play a constructive role in tackling the insurgency
  • Nigerian politicians and religious leaders must do all they can to avoid alienating the country’s youth during this election, or they may otherwise become a future source of instability

October briefing

Our October briefing comes a week after an extraordinary announcement from the governments of Nigeria and Chad that a ceasefire agreement has been reached with Boko Haram. The deal is said to include a commitment from the insurgents to imminently return the Chibok girls.

However, the girls are yet to be released, and Boko Haram are reported to have carried out a series of attacks in north-east Nigeria in recent days, including an attack on the strategic town of Damboa in Borno state. There have also been reports of more girls being kidnapped.

Though the Chadian government has dismissed the attacks as the work of irreconcilable factions in Boko Haram, they do cast doubt on the ceasefire. The credibility of Boko Haram’s “representative” during the talks, Danladi Ahmadu, has also been questioned by sources familiar with the group’s leaders, most notably the journalist Ahmad Salkida.

We hope these doubts are put to rest and the ongoing negotiations bear fruit. The next few days will be a test of their credibility.

This month’s briefing includes an analysis of the ceasefire deal, a piece by Elizabeth Pearson examining the increasingly important role women are playing in Boko Haram, and an article by Ryan Cummings assessing the options for bringing back the Chibok girls.

I would also like to use this briefing as an opportunity to pay tribute to Senator Musiliu Obanikoro, who recently stepped down as Minister of State for Defence. Senator Obanikoro’s willingness to embrace a holistic approach to tackling Boko Haram has set a strong example for the rest of the security establishment to follow. We wish him well for the future.

Andrew Noakes

Our analysis

Nigeria’s Boko Haram ceasefire deal: too good to be true?
Andrew Noakes questions the credibility of the ceasefire deal reached with Boko Haram. He warns of the danger of political motivations becoming a driving force behind the approach to the insurgency, noting that both the APC and the PDP have been guilty of politicising the war. He calls on all parties to agree to keep politics out of the counter-insurgency campaign.

Nigeria’s female suicide bombers: a show of strength
Elizabeth Pearson argues that although the deployment of female suicide bombers by Boko Haram has not proved a long-term tactic thus far, women are playing an increasingly important role in the insurgency. They are particularly useful for helping the group to conduct its activities, such as smuggling weapons, in secret. The use of female suicide bombers has served an important propaganda purpose and initially helped to divert attention away from Boko Haram’s operations in the north-east.

Where are our girls?
In this piece by Ryan Cummings, he assesses the various options open to the Nigerian government to secure the release of the Chibok girls. He argues that a negotiated settlement is very possible, though the government must be careful not to give too much away. He questions whether a military operation to rescue the girls would be feasible, given the level of risk involved.

Key points from this briefing

  • There are reasons to question the credibility of the ceasefire deal with Boko Haram, though we remain hopeful that negotiations will bear fruit.
  • Politicisation of the insurgency is becoming a major hindrance to efforts to tackle it.
  • The emergence of female suicide bombers shows Boko Haram’s ability to wage an effective propaganda campaign and divert attention away from its real goals.
  • Women are playing an increasingly important role in Boko Haram in general.
  • The government’s best option for securing the release of the Chibok girls is a negotiated settlement, though it must be careful not to give too much away.

September briefing

Since our last briefing in August, Boko Haram has made major territorial gains in Nigeria’s north-east region, seizing a string of towns in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. In our special report, North-east Nigeria on the brink, we warned that Maiduguri – the capital of Borno – was in danger of being attacked.

Since then, Boko Haram has advanced to within 35km of Maiduguri and is now launching attacks on the nearby town of Konduga. Though the pace of the insurgency’s gains has slowed in the last two weeks, the threat to Maiduguri remains.

As well as featuring our special report, this briefing includes a piece from Ryan Cummings analysing the connection between events in Iraq and Nigeria, an article from Alkasim Abdulkadir questioning controversial claims made by Stephen Davis about Boko Haram’s political supporters, new analysis from Zacharias Pieri on Boko Haram’s plans for a caliphate in northern Nigeria, and an interview from the Testimonial Archive Project providing a rare insight into what’s going on in the towns captured by Boko Haram.

Andrew Noakes

Our analysis

North-east Nigeria on the brink
In a joint report from the members of the Nigeria Security Network, we warn of the danger posed to Maiduguri and the rest of north-east Nigeria following Boko Haram’s rapid territorial gains. We warn that the military must act quickly to send reinforcements, ammunition, and equipment to the north-east to counter Boko Haram’s changing tactics.

Of Caliphates
Ryan Cummings answers some commonly asked questions about the connections between the Islamic State in Iraq and Boko Haram in Nigeria. He concludes Boko Haram’s aspirations for a caliphate predate the Islamic State and that it is unlikely the two groups will develop a formal alliance due to Boko Haram’s relationship with al-Qaeda.

Boko Haram, Stephen Davis and the strange tales from Perth
Alkasim Abdulkadir questions the credibility of Stephen Davis and his claims about Boko Haram’s political connections. He argues Davis cannot have gone to north-east Nigeria and would not have been seen by Boko Haram as a legitimate intermediary.

Boko Haram’s Islamic Caliphate is becoming a reality in Northeastern Nigeria
In this analysis piece, Zacharias Pieri provides some historical context for Boko Haram’s stated aim of establishing a caliphate, explaining that the insurgents are inspired by Dan Fodio’s Sokoto Caliphate. He also shows how the group is developing the infrastructure for a caliphate in the north-east.

‘How can you depend on the military to protect you?’
In this interview from Saratu Abiola’s Testimonial Archive Project, a resident of Maiduguri relays information from towns captured by Boko Haram. He reveals that only women and the old remain in captured areas, Boko Haram are doing nothing to provide services, and people are struggling to feed themselves. He adds that he supports the military but does not trust them, though he points out the CJTF have done much to improve relations between the people and the army.

Key points from this briefing

  • Boko Haram has not yet attacked Maiduguri but they remain in control of large parts of Borno State.
  • The military must continue to reinforce Borno and provide enough ammunition and functional equipment to counter-attack.
  • Boko Haram’s tactics have changed in the north-east. They have gone from carrying out hit-and-run attacks to seizing and holding territory.
  • Boko Haram is not going to join up with the Islamic State in Iraq, though they have undoubtedly been spurred on by its successes.
  • The insurgency’s aim of establishing a caliphate has historical roots.
  • Stephen Davis’s claims about Boko Haram’s political connections are highly dubious.
  • There is no evidence of Boko Haram attempting to govern in any meaningful way in the areas it has captured.
  • The military are not trusted by the local population in the north-east, though the CJTF have improved relations a little.