Thank you

Dear friends,

Today marks the last day of the Nigeria Security Network. After starting our collaborative venture over two years ago we’ve decided to move on to new projects. The network’s members will all continue to work on Nigerian security issues through their various ventures and activities, and remain committed to finding peace and protecting human rights there.

When we first setup the group, the Chibok abduction was a tragic illustration of how badly the people of Nigeria were suffering from Boko Haram’s violence. In the two years between now and then, the situation has improved and worsened at various times, but I think we now find ourselves in better condition overall. The Nigerian government has started thinking differently about counter-insurgency and recognising the need to respect human rights in the fight against terrorism. The creation of a Nigerian army office to investigate human rights violations is just one recent sign of progress.

But there is still much to do. Until Nigeria is completely safe from Boko Haram, the work goes on.

Thank you for your support over the last two years. We hope that our efforts were useful in some way to all of you.


Andrew Noakes

Nigeria’s Private Army: a perception study of private military contractors in the war against Boko Haram

The Nigeria Security Network is pleased to publish our latest report: “Nigeria’s Private Army: a perception study of private military contractors in the war against Boko Haram

The study examines public attitudes in Nigeria towards private military contractors in the context of the war against Boko Haram.

In January 2015 reports began to circulate in Nigerian media that former South African soldiers had been hired by the Nigerian government to aid in its counter-insurgency effort against Boko Haram. Investigations by the New York Times and Voice of America in March subsequently alleged that hundreds of private military contractors, mostly from South Africa and some from Eastern Europe, were directly participating in combat operations in Borno state, north-east Nigeria. This was denied by the Nigerian government.

The precise role private military contractors played in the fight against Boko Haram early in 2015 remains disputed. This report does not seek to comment on these claims either way. It seeks to examine public attitudes towards the potential use of private military contractors in the war against Boko Haram in order to inform future policy.

The study used a national telephone survey and social media analysis to gain an insight into how contractors are perceived by Nigerians and whether their use might potentially alienate sections of the population and risk reinforcing Boko Haram’s narrative.

The data from our study suggests that the majority of Nigerians support using private military contractors to fight Boko Haram. However, within the minority that oppose their use, some expressed opinions that could be vulnerable to manipulation by Boko Haram, due to their emphasis on western meddling in Nigerian affairs. The pitfalls of bolstering a wallowing Nigerian army with an array of secretive western PMSCs are underexplored – but have the potential to be particularly alarming given Boko Haram’s ability to mobilise anti-western and anti-government sentiment.

Our research suggests that opposition to PMSCs is strongest when they are engaged in combat roles, and that their potential for carrying out human rights abuses with impunity was of particular concern.

Reducing the reliance on PMSCs by governments struggling against poor capacity and mounting insecurity is a challenge not unique to Nigeria. However, it should galvanise efforts to professionalise the Nigerian military so that they can fill the gap. This must include ensuring they comply with the highest human rights standards.


October security briefing

This month brought news that the United States is stepping up its involvement in the fight against Boko Haram. As John Campbell notes in his latest blog, the US will establish a drone base in Cameroon and deploy 300 military personnel in non-combat roles. The announcement follows news that the US has also deployed special operations soldiers to facilitate counter-insurgency against Boko Haram in Niger.

The US bringing its expertise, experience, and resources to bear in the fight against Boko Haram may give a major boost to the regional counter-terrorism effort, but this must be balanced with prudence and restraint. A light footprint, non-combat role is preferable in a region where aggressive interference from Western countries could easily backfire and play into Boko Haram’s hands.

As well as John Campbell’s blog covering the latest US deployment, this month’s briefing includes a piece from Elizabeth Pearson analysing the role of female suicide bombers in Boko Haram and a major report from Cheta Nwanze on communal violence in the Middle Belt.

Andrew Noakes

Our analysis

Boko Haram and Nigeria’s female bombers (paywall – RUSI membership)
Elizabeth Pearson argues that Boko Haram uses female suicide bombers in order to gain maximum publicity for its attacks and enhance the impact of its terror. She further analyses their use at the level of gender norms and at the organisational level.

US drone base in Cameroon
John Campbell gives an overview of the recent announcement that the United States will establish a drone base in Cameroon to aid the region in its fight against Boko Haram. He notes that despite the non-combat role of the personnel deployed there is always a risk of troops getting drawn into confrontation inadvertently.

Terror in Nigeria’s food basket
Cheta Nwanze’s SBM Intelligence issues a major report detailing communal violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, an often forgotten conflict that has produced casualties on the same scale as the Boko Haram conflict in north-east Nigeria. The research details methodical violence by herdsmen against host communities, and of herdsmen facing increasing violence from cattle-rustlers, coupled with a decline in grazing resources. Attitudes towards the Fulani are hardening, and there is evidence of a slow loss of confidence in the ability of the security forces to keep law and order.

Key points from this briefing

  • Using female suicide bombers allows Boko Haram to maximise publicity for its attacks
  • The US deployment to Cameroon can be cautiously welcomed but care must be taken to maintain a light footprint
  • The conflict in Nigeria’s Middle Belt is often forgotten; with violence to equal Boko Haram’s and a deteriorating situation the government must restore confidence in its capacity to maintain law and order in the region

September briefing

In this month’s briefing NSN member Andrew Walker takes us back to the Maitatsine uprising in 1984, recalling how the then military head of state, General Buhari, flew to Yola to personally oversee the destruction of a neighbourhood in which Islamist militants had found refuge.

The story is especially pertinent in light of the three month deadline the president recently gave to the Nigerian military to defeat Boko Haram. NSN member John Campbell argues in this month’s briefing that this has led the military to seek quick and decisive military solutions to the insurgency.

The new government set a clear agenda early on to tackle the underlying causes of Boko Haram, warning this may take years. This agenda must continue to be central to the government’s strategy if it is to prevail, and any use of military force must emphasise civilian protection and respect for human rights if it is to avoid becoming counter-productive in the long-term.

Andrew Noakes

Our analysis

Buhari and Boko Haram: A return to brutality?
Andrew Walker reminds us of President Buhari’s previous attempt to tackle an Islamist insurgency in Nigeria, resulting in the near-destruction of a neighbourhood of Yola. He warns that with the Nigerian military’s track record of human rights violations, conclusions that we have entered a new period of protecting and respecting the population may be premature.

Claims of military success against Boko Haram
John Campbell reports on recent claims by the Nigerian army of major successes against Boko Haram, including capturing hundreds of militants. He suggests it is difficult to verify these claims, but notes Boko Haram seem to be diversifying their tactics and expanding their geographic reach even as the army reportedly enjoys success against them.

Why would a Boko Haram faction want to negotiate?
Ryan Cummings explores the different theories on Boko Haram’s factionalism and the various motivations they may have for wanting to negotiate with the government. He concludes that the group may want to negotiate, but that misinformation may also be to blame.

Is Boko Haram spreading to Lagos?
Ryan Cummings notes recent reports that Boko Haram has spread to Lagos, and reminds us that militants have in fact operated there before. He argues that Lagos is a high value target for Boko Haram. But he concludes that Boko Haram will struggle to gain a permanent or substantial foothold in Lagos because the group would not command significant grassroots support there.

Key points from this briefing

  • Pressure on the military to produce a quick victory against Boko Haram may encourage a return to short-termism and military-only strategies
  • It is vital to the success of Nigeria’s counter-terrorism strategy that it focuses on the long-term drivers of terrorism and ensures protection for human rights during military operations
  • Boko Haram appears to have different factions, some of which may be inclined to negotiate with the government, but there is a great deal of misinformation on this issue
  • Boko Haram does operate in Lagos but is unlikely to develop a permanent or substantial foothold there because of its limitations in attracting support

August briefing

This month saw significant speculation about the fate of Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s leader and figurehead, after Chadian president Idriss Deby alleged that he had been replaced by another Boko Haram commander named Muhammad Daud. Nonetheless, as NSN member John Campbell points out in his latest blog, Shekau resurfaced a few days later with a threatening audio message re-affirming Boko Haram’s allegiance to Islamic State.

Some observers had assumed that Shekau’s absence from recent Boko Haram videos suggested his fall from power, or even his death. But we would do well to remember the insurgents appear to be diversifying their media strategy, using videos of their operations and talks by other commanders instead of relying solely on routine messages from Shekau. His absence may well be the product of this growing sophistication.

This month’s briefing also deals with news of released Boko Haram captives, with Ryan Cummings providing a critical account of recent reports that 178 captives were freed from Boko Haram. It includes analysis from Jacob Zenn alleging that Boko Haram fighters are mixing with Islamic State militants in Libya. If true, this will raise alarm bells among those who fear growing links between Islamist militants in West Africa and internationally. Finally, Zacharias Pieri completes this month’s briefing with a comprehensive set of analyses from the Global Initiative Analysis, including an editorial focusing on the need for Nigeria to ‘clear, hold, and build’ in the fight against Boko Haram.

Andrew Noakes

Our analysis

Nigeria’s Abubakar Shekau is back, if he ever left
Ambassador John Campbell suggests Abubakar Shekau’s recent audio message puts an end to speculation about his demise. He also notes that the message’s content seems to have more of a global focus than usual, though it is too early to draw any conclusions.

Uncertainty dampens optimism of Boko Haram releases
Ryan Cummings offers a critical account of recent reports that Boko Haram captives have been released. He asks how the military was able to rescue as many as 178 captives on 3 August without them being harmed by Boko Haram in the process. He speculates that there may have been negotiation between Boko Haram and the government to secure the captives.

Wilayat West Africa reboots for the Caliphate
Jacob Zenn analyses the relationship between Boko Haram and Islamic State, arguing that Boko Haram over-extended in its effort to emulate Islamic State and hold territory in recent months. He suggests that one consequence of Boko Haram’s retreat from territory it had managed to capture in 2014/15 is a strengthening of ties with Islamic State militants in Libya.

USF Global Initiative Analysis
Zacharias Pieri and the team at the University of South Florida offer a range of analysis in their latest Global Initiative Analysis, including an editorial focusing on the need for the Nigerian military to hold onto and develop territory it has re-taken from Boko Haram fighters.

Key points from this briefing

  • Abubakar Shekau appears to be maintaining his position as leader and figurehead of Boko Haram
  • Shekau’s disappearance from Boko Haram’s videos may simply reflect the diversification of the group’s media strategy
  • There is cause to doubt recent reports of Boko Haram captives being released from detention, and to think there may be quiet negotiation going on between the insurgents and the government
  • Boko Haram over-extended in its bid to capture territory
  • There appear to be growing links between Boko Haram and Islamic State militants in Libya
  • It is vital for the Nigerian military to ‘clear, hold, build’

July briefing

President Buhari’s recent talks with Cameroon’s President Biya on Boko Haram, as well as his appointment of a Nigerian commander to head the new Multi-National Joint Task Force, reflect the importance of developing a regional response to Boko Haram.

The new task force is expected to have the vital ability to cross borders in order to pursue Boko Haram throughout the Lake Chad basin. Until now, longstanding territorial disputes between Nigeria and Cameroon have got in the way of that capability – to Boko Haram’s benefit.

Many of NSN’s analysts suspect that Boko Haram wish to create an Islamic territory along the geographic lines of the old Kanuri Empire, which cuts across Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger – all of which are in Boko Haram’s current operational space. Just as Boko Haram does not recognise national borders, so too the response must be essentially cross-border – a point emphasised by Ryan Cummings in this month’s briefing.

This should begin with the multi-national force, but ultimately extend further. Countries affected by Boko Haram could all benefit by sharing intelligence as a matter of course, allowing cross-border operations, and planning operations and long-term strategy together at a senior level.

Andrew Noakes

Our analysis

Strategic shifts and strategic talks in the Boko Haram insurgency
Ryan Cummings argues that a regional response to Boko Haram is critical to defeating the insurgency, but warns that it has not yet got off the ground. Boko Haram continues to be defined by other countries as Nigeria’s problem spilling over to their borders, rather than an insurgency with roots outside of Nigeria. He calls on Cameroon in particular to recognise the domestic threat posed by Boko Haram.

TAP interview on Boko Haram’s impact on agricultural livelihoods
Saratu Abiola’s Testimonial Archive Project brings us another insightful interview into the situation in north-east Nigeria, this time through an interview with Dr. Oluwasina Olabanji who manages agricultural projects in conflict-affected areas. The interview paints a dark picture of the impact Boko Haram’s violence has had on agricultural livelihoods in the region, with many farmers too afraid to farm their land.

Buhari visit to reset the bilateral relationship
In his latest blog on Nigeria, Ambassador Campbell sets the scene for President Buhari’s visit to Washington earlier this month. He views Buhari’s visit as an opportunity to reset relations between the US and Nigeria following a difficult year under the previous administration, with allegations of human rights violations and lack of support for the counter-insurgency traded between Washington and Abuja.

Key points from this briefing

  • Boko Haram does not recognise national borders and operates in a cross-border space
  • The response to Boko Haram must be regional in nature, with the new multi-national force serving as a good first step
  • Boko Haram’s violence has had a devastating impact on the agricultural economy in north-east Nigeria, with many farmers too afraid to farm their land
  • President Buhari’s visit to Washington was an opportunity to reset relations between Nigeria and the US after a difficult year

June briefing

This month’s briefing reflects on the security challenges inherited by President Buhari as we mark one month since his inauguration. Though territorially diminished, Boko Haram shows no sign of being defeated. As NSN member Ryan Cummings notes, the group has continued to carry out attacks in recent weeks, killing up to 82 people, including in direct assaults on the capital of Borno state.

As we have suggested in the past, it would be wrong to equate Boko Haram’s territorial losses with defeat. NSN member Saratu Abiola’s recent interview with an IDP fleeing Boko Haram is a reminder that people in the north-east continue to suffer. With that in mind, we commend President Buhari’s recent call for Boko Haram to come to the negotiating table. Now that the group’s territorial ambitions have been checked, the time may be more conducive to fruitful discussions. Much though depends on Boko Haram’s temperament.

In any case, as Ambassador Campbell reminds us, the solutions to Nigeria’s challenges will take a great deal of time to implement and we should not expect any quick fixes.

Andrew Noakes

Our analysis

New Nigerian president inherits same Boko Haram violence
Ryan Cummings notes that Boko Haram attacks have continued to plague Nigeria’s north-east and neighbouring countries since President Buhari’s inauguration. Boko Haram’s territorial losses have not translated into defeat, with the group reverting to its asymmetric tactics. He also suggests that the insurgency’s relationship with Islamic State may have strengthened it in recent months. Finally, he praises President Buhari for bringing new momentum to the counter-insurgency, particularly by relocating Nigeria’s military command to the north-east.

Inauguration day in Nigeria
John Campbell reflects on Nigeria’s presidential inauguration day at the end of last month, drawing attention to the multiple challenges that Nigeria’s new president faces, from the Boko Haram insurgency to the threat of violence in the Niger Delta. He concludes that President Buhari will need considerable time to solve the problems he has inherited.

TAP interview with IDP from Adamawa State
In this interview with an IDP who fled her village in Adamawa, Saratu Abiola’s Testimonial Archive Project again draws attention to the ongoing suffering of people in the north-east. The interviewee explains how her village came under attack and it has been a struggle to find a place to live ever since due to the large number of people fleeing. She expresses her hope that the new government will act to stop the violence.

Key points from this briefing

  • Boko Haram has launched several attacks in the last month and people in the north-east continue to suffer
  • Boko Haram’s relationship with Islamic State may have strengthened them in recent months
  • Circumstances may now be more conducive to negotiations with Boko Haram, if they are willing
  • President Buhari should be praised for bringing fresh initiative to the counter-insurgency, particularly by re-locating the military command