Following President-elect Buhari’s victory in the presidential election last month, we were pleased to see the incoming president call for a renewed effort to tackle the underlying causes of the Boko Haram insurgency. Writing in the New York Times, President-elect Buhari called for Nigeria to “address why it is that young people join Boko Haram”, and pointed to lack of education as a core driver of the conflict.

Indeed, education is an important way to tackle poverty and to challenge extremist views. But the full spectrum of underlying causes must be addressed, including not only lack of education but poverty more broadly, political marginalisation, and human rights violations. In particular, accountability for past human rights violations in the fight against Boko Haram would send a powerful signal to the people of the north-east that the new government is serious about addressing the roots of the conflict.

This month’s briefing contains commentary from John Campbell on President-elect Buhari’s new strategy for countering Boko Haram, an interview with the Executive Director of Nigeria’s National Human Rights Commission from the Testimonial Archive Project, a piece from Jason Warner on how to re-build Nigeria after Boko Haram, and analysis from Emily Mellgard of the Tony Blair Faith Foundation.

Andrew Noakes
Director
NSN

Our analysis

Buhari’s strategy for stopping Boko Haram
In this blog, John Campbell praises President-elect Buhari’s new strategy for tackling Boko Haram, noting that it is astute, realistic, and within his power to implement. He focuses in particular on Buhari’s recognition of the socio-economic causes of the Boko Haram insurgency, and welcomes his decision to focus on female education.

Saratu Abiola’s Testimonial Archive Project interviews the Executive Director of the National Human Rights Commission, Chidi Odinkalu. The interview focuses on the plight of internally displaced persons in Nigeria’s north-east, and sheds light on abuse of IDPs as well as their exploitation for political purposes during the recent election campaign.

After Boko Haram: how to re-build Nigeria
Jason Warner co-authors this piece on how to re-build Nigeria after Boko Haram. He notes that the conflict has caused enormous economic damage and has uprooted Borno state’s social and political system. If the north-east is neglected now, further turmoil could ensue in the years to come as new armed groups emerge.

Emily Mellgard provides an overview of Boko Haram’s leadership, ideology, recruitment, and international links in this outline of the insurgent group. She warns that although Boko Haram appears to have been put on the back foot in recent weeks, the group is resilient to eradication.

Key points from this briefing

• President-elect Buhari is right to focus on tackling the underlying causes of the Boko Haram insurgency

• Education is an important area to concentrate on but other areas also need attention, including human rights, political inclusion, and development more broadly

• Internally displaced people in Nigeria’s north-east continue to suffer greatly, including from abuse while in IDP camps

• Boko Haram is likely to prove resilient in the face of recent territorial gains by the government

• However, if Boko Haram can be defeated there must be a major reconstruction effort in the north-east to prevent further conflict

This month’s briefing comes on the day of Nigeria’s presidential election, which is now taking place after the government and its regional partners successfully cleared Boko Haram out of much of its territory in the north-east.

The government should be congratulated for its rapid territorial gains against Boko Haram over the last few weeks. However, in our new special report, The end of Boko Haram?, we warn the insurgents are likely to melt back into the countryside and continue the guerrilla warfare that characterised Boko Haram’s fighting up until mid-2014. Nigeria’s next government must not assume the war is over. The report also warns that the use of foreign military advisers in the conflict should be restricted to non-combat roles.

This month’s briefing includes our special report, as well as analysis from Jacob Zenn focusing on Boko Haram’s emergence as part of a transnational jihadist movement, the launch of a new Boko Haram tracker from Zacharias Pieri and his colleagues at the University of South Florida, and an interview from the Testimonial Archive Project with a member of Baga’s Civilian JTF, among other contributions.

Andrew Noakes
Director
NSN

Our analysis

In our special report, we warn that the government’s recent territorial gains against Boko Haram do not signal the end of the insurgency. We argue that Boko Haram is likely to continue waging a guerrilla war now that it has been chased from the battlefield. We also warn against foreign military advisers becoming directly involved in combat.

Foreign mercenaries will worsen the Boko Haram insurgency
Andrew Noakes speculates about the impact foreign mercenaries could have on the Boko Haram insurgency, following unconfirmed reports foreign military advisors have become involved in the combat in north-east Nigeria. He argues that the short-term military gains could soon be eclipsed by dire political consequences.

Jacob Zenn charts Boko Haram’s emergence as part of a wider transnational jihadist movement. He warns it may evolve into a revamped Islamic State version of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) that is capable of competing for a recruiting pool in an area of operations spanning from Nigeria to Libya.

Zacharias Pieri is part of the team at the University of South Florida behind the Global Initiative Analysis: Nigeria and Boko Haram tracker. This issue examines whether we have reached a turning point in the counter-insurgency campaign, looks at Boko Haram’s key narratives, and makes recommendations on governance and security, among other topics.

In this blog, Ryan Cummings analyses the security challenges facing the Nigerian elections, including political unrest following the results and Boko Haram attacks.

Saratu Abiola’s Testimonial Archive Project records an interview with a member of Baga’s Civilian JTF. He recalls Boko Haram’s notorious attack on Baga, saying that soldiers fled as CJTF volunteers stayed to fight.

Nigeria re-takes territory from Boko Haram
John Campbell tracks the re-capturing of Boko Haram territory by the government and its partners and comments on the possible reasons behind the rapid reversal in fortunes. He argues six weeks is too short a time for the Nigerian army to have transformed itself into a force capable of defeating Boko Haram

Key points from this briefing

• The government should be praised for turning the tide against Boko Haram, though the insurgency is unlikely to be defeated
• The use of foreign military advisers in combat roles may backfire on the government if they are indeed being used in this way
• Nigerian army soldiers fled from Boko Haram as Baga was attacked
• Boko Haram could be emerging as an Islamic State version of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
• There are multiple security challenges surrounding the upcoming elections, particularly from political unrest and Boko Haram
• Boko Haram is likely to exploit grievances following the presidential election
• Attacks against Western interests in Nigeria are growing more likely

NSN has published a new special report,  The report focuses on Nigeria’s recent territorial gains against the insurgency in the country’s north-east, and the role of foreign military advisors.

The report notes the extraordinary progress the Nigerian government has made in pushing Boko Haram out of territory in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, but warns this does not signal the end of the insurgency.

“The insurgency does not need to operate like a conventional army, which can be expelled from territory in a series of pitched battles”, the report says. “Instead, it has the capacity to quickly melt away into the countryside and avoid large-scale confrontation.”

The report continues, “Boko Haram can be expected to retreat into its hideouts and switch back to fighting the guerrilla campaign it was engaged in up until the middle of 2014.” The recent spate of suicide bombings, including in Borno state’s capital Maiduguri, are a strong indication of this.

The report notes confirmed reports of foreign advisors providing assistance to the Nigerian military, and unconfirmed reports that this assistance involves direct participation in combat. While supporting the former as a necessary form of capacity building, NSN expresses serious concern about the possibility of foreign soldiers becoming involved in combat.

NSN has not been able to verify the unconfirmed reports of foreign advisors being involved in combat.

Even if the reports of advisors becoming involved in combat are exaggerated, the experts warn that the distinction between advisor and mercenary can break down very quickly. “Private military contractors who advise, train, mentor, and maintain equipment can easily find themselves playing a combat role even if it was unintended”, the report notes.

NSN recommends that the use of foreign advisors be restricted to training and advice, and that the government should continue to focus on building the capacity of the Nigerian army to implement a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy against Boko Haram.

Find the full report .

The Nigerian military’s success in recent days and weeks recapturing territory from Boko Haram should give observers cause for relief. Complemented by regional intervention from Nigeria’s neighbours, the Nigerian army appears to be making significant gains in the north-east. We must hope this is the beginning of a reversal of Boko Haram’s fortunes over the last few months.

Much of the analysis over recent weeks has focused on President Jonathan’s decision to postpone the presidential election in order to give the army a chance to recapture territory. As ever, NSN’s own focus remains on the security situation. However, we remain concerned about the possibility that Boko Haram could destabilise Nigeria’s democracy and trigger considerable violence and unrest more broadly in the country.

This month’s analysis focuses on Boko Haram’s evolving media and public messaging strategy, Boko Haram’s threat to the elections, the insurgency’s geographic spread, and the response to the insurgency.

Andrew Noakes
Director
NSN

Our analysis

This piece by Zacharias Pieri argues Boko Haram is learning from Islamic State, especially with respect to its media and public messaging strategy.

Ryan Cummings examines the threat Boko Haram poses to Nigerian democracy and the upcoming elections. He assesses the risks across geographic areas and types of target, and analyses the political implications of Boko Haram’s violence.

Ryan Cummings picks apart the various fact/fiction debates surrounding Boko Haram, including the group’s name, its relationship with Islamic State, and its hold over territory.

In this interview, Nnamdi Obasi answers a series of questions about Boko Haram and the counter-insurgency, including whether the West should intervene military in Nigeria and what the best strategy for defeating the insurgency is.

Jacob Zenn analyses Boko Haram’s expansion into the Lake Chad region. He concludes that the insurgency’s focus is still on Borno but is also expanding to neighbouring countries, including with respect to recruitment.

Has the tide turned against Boko Haram in Nigeria?
John Campbell argues that recent gains against Boko Haram by the Nigerian military may be enough to satisfy President Jonathan’s criteria for holding elections.

Key points from this briefing

• Boko Haram is learning from Islamic State and developing a more sophisticated media and public messaging strategy
• Boko Haram represents a clear threat to Nigerian democracy, particularly because their attacks have the potential to cause a political crisis
• Boko Haram does not hold territory in the traditional sense, often leaving captured areas undefended
• There must be no major Western military intervention in Nigeria because it would be resented by Nigerians and could be counter-productive
• There still remain problems in the Nigerian army with lack of resources, equipment, and poor motivation
• Boko Haram is still mostly focused on Borno but is extending its reach into countries in the Lake Chad region
• The Nigerian military’s successes in recent weeks may make elections possible

As the Boko Haram insurgency continues in the north-east, the Senate is deadlocked on the extension of the state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states. Many senators have complained that emergency rule has made little difference in the region, or even that it has made things worse.

It is important for the government to have a clear legal framework through which it can prosecute the counter-insurgency campaign. Nonetheless, it must ensure this framework does not enable human rights violations or other abuses that are ultimately counter-productive. Tangible assurances on this issue may well help assuage the concerns of many northern senators.

The protection of human rights as part of a successful counter-insurgency strategy is a central point in a new report from Ambassador John Campbell that we feature in this month’s briefing. The report is aimed at the US government and advises what the United States can do to assist Nigeria in tackling Boko Haram.

This month’s briefing also features new from Jacob Zenn on Boko Haram’s recruitment, operations, and financing in the Lake Chad region, a report on Nigeria’s elections from Oliver Owen, observations about Boko Haram’s governance in areas where it has captured territory from John Campbell, a feature on the socio-economic and political drivers of the insurgency, analysis from Ryan Cummings on Chad’s role in the conflict, a by Emily Mellgard on the role of youth and the potential for unrest during the upcoming elections, and a new from the Testimonial Archive Project.

Andrew Noakes
Coordinator
Nigeria Security Network

Our analysis

Can the US help Nigeria confront Boko Haram?
This report from John Campbell calls on the US government to press Abuja privately and publicly on the human rights record of the Nigerian security forces. It emphasises the importance of tackling the underlying drivers of the insurgency and ensuring the counter-insurgency campaign commands public support. It also calls on the US to reach out to Nigeria’s Muslim population, in part by establishing a diplomatic presence in Kano.

This analysis from Jacob Zenn draws attention to new trends in Boko Haram’s recruitment, operations, and financing. It concludes that Boko Haram is using forced conscription to boost its numbers, with as many as 50,000 now estimated to be fighting for or assisting the insurgency. It also notes that Boko Haram is increasingly turning its attention to Cameroon, in part to secure supply lines for weapons.

Incumbency and Opportunity: forecasting Nigeria’s 2015 elections
Co-authored by Oliver Owen, this research suggests President Jonathan is likely to win an overall majority in the 2015 presidential election, but not necessarily the required one-quarter of votes in two-thirds of states.

Nigeria’s Boko Haram moving towards governance?
John Campbell uses this blog to draw attention to media reports indicating Boko Haram is providing security for residents in towns it has captured and ordering shops to open. This would suggest a move towards some kind of governance, though the reports conflict with other stories of Boko Haram violence in occupied communities.

What does Boko Haram want?
This piece analyses some of the socio-economic and political drivers of the Boko Haram insurgency. It advises that any peace deal with the insurgents must include accountability for human rights violations and measures to address under-development in the north.

The Boko Haram ceasefire and the Chadian gambit
In this blog by Ryan Cummings, he analyses Chad’s role in the conflict. He suggests Chad has an interest in promoting stability on its borders by encouraging talks between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government, as well as the Chadian president having a personal interest in discrediting rumours that he is a Boko Haram sponsor.

Emily Mellgard warns that religious and political leaders risk triggering social unrest around the upcoming elections by failing to positively engage young people. She concludes that youth alienation could be a major factor behind future instability in Nigeria.

In this interview with Saratu Abiola’s Testimonial Archive Project, a resident of Gombe recalls a terrorist attack in which he came face to face with Boko Haram militants.

Key points from this briefing

• The United States can help Nigeria tackle Boko Haram by encouraging it to respect human rights and tackle the underlying drivers of the conflict
• The US should also establish a diplomatic presence in Kano and reach out to Nigeria’s Muslims
• Boko Haram is swelling its ranks with forced conscription and has become much more active in Cameroon
• President Jonathan may struggle to meet all the requirements necessary to win the election outright
• There are reports that Boko Haram is establishing some form of governance in captured territories
• The socio-economic and political drivers of the conflict must be addressed as part of any peace deal
• Chad has a number of motivations to play a constructive role in tackling the insurgency
• Nigerian politicians and religious leaders must do all they can to avoid alienating the country’s youth during this election, or they may otherwise become a future source of instability

Our October briefing comes a week after an extraordinary announcement from the governments of Nigeria and Chad that a ceasefire agreement has been reached with Boko Haram. The deal is said to include a commitment from the insurgents to imminently return the Chibok girls.

However, the girls are yet to be released, and Boko Haram are reported to have carried out a series of attacks in north-east Nigeria in recent days, including an attack on the strategic town of Damboa in Borno state. There have also been reports of more girls being kidnapped.

Though the Chadian government has dismissed the attacks as the work of irreconcilable factions in Boko Haram, they do cast doubt on the ceasefire. The credibility of Boko Haram’s “representative” during the talks, Danladi Ahmadu, has also been questioned by sources familiar with the group’s leaders, most notably the journalist Ahmad Salkida.

We hope these doubts are put to rest and the ongoing negotiations bear fruit. The next few days will be a test of their credibility.

This month’s briefing includes an analysis of the ceasefire deal, a piece by Elizabeth Pearson examining the increasingly important role women are playing in Boko Haram, and an article by Ryan Cummings assessing the options for bringing back the Chibok girls.

I would also like to use this briefing as an opportunity to pay tribute to Senator Musiliu Obanikoro, who recently stepped down as Minister of State for Defence. Senator Obanikoro’s willingness to embrace a holistic approach to tackling Boko Haram has set a strong example for the rest of the security establishment to follow. We wish him well for the future.

Andrew Noakes
Coordinator
NSN

Our analysis

Nigeria’s Boko Haram ceasefire deal: too good to be true?
Andrew Noakes questions the credibility of the ceasefire deal reached with Boko Haram. He warns of the danger of political motivations becoming a driving force behind the approach to the insurgency, noting that both the APC and the PDP have been guilty of politicising the war. He calls on all parties to agree to keep politics out of the counter-insurgency campaign.

Nigeria’s female suicide bombers: a show of strength
Elizabeth Pearson argues that although the deployment of female suicide bombers by Boko Haram has not proved a long-term tactic thus far, women are playing an increasingly important role in the insurgency. They are particularly useful for helping the group to conduct its activities, such as smuggling weapons, in secret. The use of female suicide bombers has served an important propaganda purpose and initially helped to divert attention away from Boko Haram’s operations in the north-east.

Where are our girls?
In this piece by Ryan Cummings, he assesses the various options open to the Nigerian government to secure the release of the Chibok girls. He argues that a negotiated settlement is very possible, though the government must be careful not to give too much away. He questions whether a military operation to rescue the girls would be feasible, given the level of risk involved.

Key points from this briefing

• There are reasons to question the credibility of the ceasefire deal with Boko Haram, though we remain hopeful that negotiations will bear fruit.
• Politicisation of the insurgency is becoming a major hindrance to efforts to tackle it.
• The emergence of female suicide bombers shows Boko Haram’s ability to wage an effective propaganda campaign and divert attention away from its real goals.
• Women are playing an increasingly important role in Boko Haram in general.
• The government’s best option for securing the release of the Chibok girls is a negotiated settlement, though it must be careful not to give too much away.

Since our last briefing in August, Boko Haram has made major territorial gains in Nigeria’s north-east region, seizing a string of towns in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. In our special report, , we warned that Maiduguri – the capital of Borno – was in danger of being attacked.

Since then, Boko Haram has advanced to within 35km of Maiduguri and is now launching attacks on the nearby town of Konduga. Though the pace of the insurgency’s gains has slowed in the last two weeks, the threat to Maiduguri remains.

As well as featuring our special report, this briefing includes a piece from Ryan Cummings analysing the connection between events in Iraq and Nigeria, an article from Alkasim Abdulkadir questioning controversial claims made by Stephen Davis about Boko Haram’s political supporters, new analysis from Zacharias Pieri on Boko Haram’s plans for a caliphate in northern Nigeria, and an interview from the Testimonial Archive Project providing a rare insight into what’s going on in the towns captured by Boko Haram.

Andrew Noakes
Coordinator
NSN

Our analysis

In a joint report from the members of the Nigeria Security Network, we warn of the danger posed to Maiduguri and the rest of north-east Nigeria following Boko Haram’s rapid territorial gains. We warn that the military must act quickly to send reinforcements, ammunition, and equipment to the north-east to counter Boko Haram’s changing tactics.

Ryan Cummings answers some commonly asked questions about the connections between the Islamic State in Iraq and Boko Haram in Nigeria. He concludes Boko Haram’s aspirations for a caliphate predate the Islamic State and that it is unlikely the two groups will develop a formal alliance due to Boko Haram’s relationship with al-Qaeda.

Boko Haram, Stephen Davis and the strange tales from Perth
Alkasim Abdulkadir questions the credibility of Stephen Davis and his claims about Boko Haram’s political connections. He argues Davis cannot have gone to north-east Nigeria and would not have been seen by Boko Haram as a legitimate intermediary.

Boko Haram’s Islamic Caliphate is becoming a reality in Northeastern Nigeria
In this analysis piece, Zacharias Pieri provides some historical context for Boko Haram’s stated aim of establishing a caliphate, explaining that the insurgents are inspired by Dan Fodio’s Sokoto Caliphate. He also shows how the group is developing the infrastructure for a caliphate in the north-east.

In this interview from Saratu Abiola’s Testimonial Archive Project, a resident of Maiduguri relays information from towns captured by Boko Haram. He reveals that only women and the old remain in captured areas, Boko Haram are doing nothing to provide services, and people are struggling to feed themselves. He adds that he supports the military but does not trust them, though he points out the CJTF have done much to improve relations between the people and the army.

Key points from this briefing

• Boko Haram has not yet attacked Maiduguri but they remain in control of large parts of Borno State.
• The military must continue to reinforce Borno and provide enough ammunition and functional equipment to counter-attack.
• Boko Haram’s tactics have changed in the north-east. They have gone from carrying out hit-and-run attacks to seizing and holding territory.
• Boko Haram is not going to join up with the Islamic State in Iraq, though they have undoubtedly been spurred on by its successes.
• The insurgency’s aim of establishing a caliphate has historical roots.
• Stephen Davis’s claims about Boko Haram’s political connections are highly dubious.
• There is no evidence of Boko Haram attempting to govern in any meaningful way in the areas it has captured.
• The military are not trusted by the local population in the north-east, though the CJTF have improved relations a little.